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This paper studies the optimal income redistribution and optimal monitoring when disability 
benefits are intended for disabled people but when some able agents with high distaste for 
work mimic them (type II errors). Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin and 
endogenous take-up costs may burden disabled recipients (because of either a reputational 
externality caused by cheaters or a snowball effect). Under paternalistic utilitarian preferences 
that do not compensate for distaste for work, inactive disabled recipients should obtain strictly 
lower consumption than disabled workers. The cost of monitoring supports adoption of an 
Earned Income Tax Credit. However, and surprisingly, with or without take-up costs, even if 
perfect monitoring is costless, it proves optimal to have type II errors. These results are robust 
to a utilitarian criterion. The paper provides numerical simulations calibrated on U.S. data. 
JEL-Code: H21. 














March 1, 2010 
In particular, I am extremely grateful to Katherine Cuff. She was particularly helpful in 
providing suggestions and comments at various stages of the analysis. I would also like to 
thank Philippe De Donder, Gregory Corcos, Gernot Doppelhofer, Timothy J. Goodspeed, 
Eirik Kristiansen, Laurent Simula, Erwin Ooghe, Stéphane Robin, Agnar Sandmo, Dirk 
Schindler, Fred Schroyen, Dirk Van de gaer and several participants at the 2009 CESifo 
Conference on Public Sector Economics for their advice on a previous version. The scientific 
responsibility is assumed by the author. 1 Introduction
This paper examines the optimal redistributive structure and the optimal accuracy of monitoring
when disability bene￿ts are intended for disabled people but where some able agents who have a
high distaste for work mimic them. It suggests the shape of the optimal tax-transfer system when
the government operates a costly monitoring program ￿nanced by taxation of labor income.
The standard optimal taxation model assumes that individuals are distributed over some private
characteristic, such as their individual productivity, the distribution of which is common knowledge.
Redistribution policy is limited by incentive constraints that must be satis￿ed if individuals are to
reveal their true productivity types (Mirrlees, 1971). These incentive compatibility constraints are
relaxed and redistribution is enhanced when some characteristics correlated with low productivity
(or ￿ tag￿to use the terminology introduced by Akerlof, 1978), like disability status, are monitored
for a subset of the disabled population.1
This paper di⁄ers from the existing literature by endogenizing the monitoring technology2 and
all of the behavioral responses (participation to the labor market and to disability programs),
which allows us to cast light on three important redistributive issues.
First, who gets the largest consumption level? The tagging literature shows that tagged disabled
agents obtain a larger consumption level than untagged disabled people (e.g., Akerlof, 1978; SalaniØ,
2002). This result relies on the assumption that eligible people do not work whether they are tagged
or untagged. However, some disabled people work, and others do not work and receive disability
bene￿ts in the real world.3 This paper models behavioral responses such as labor supply responses
and take-up responses as accurately as possible and shows that the optimal ranking of consumption
bundles is then reversed to give work incentives to some disabled.
Secondly, who gets the largest transfer? By de￿nition, an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
provides the largest transfer to disabled or low-productivity workers. This contrasts with a Negative
Income Tax (NIT), whereby nonemployed agents receive the largest transfer. As usual in the
literature, let us de￿ne the ratio of social marginal utility to the marginal value of public funds
as the marginal social welfare weight. Neglecting monitoring, the literature has well established
that when labor supply responses are modeled along the extensive margin (i.e., the agent decides
whether or not to participate in the labor force), a marginal social welfare weight lower (larger)
than one on disabled workers implies a NIT (EITC) (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002). Contrastingly,
this paper shows that, with a costly monitoring technology, a marginal social welfare weight lower
than one on disabled workers does not preclude an EITC.
Third, relaxing the standard assumption that monitoring, and therefore the probability of
1In this paper, the tag (disability) is perfectly correlated with low productivity, which is the basis for redistri-
bution. However, the tag is not perfectly observable; hence, tagging is not perfect. Contrastingly, in the seminal
paper of Akerlof (1978), the tag is perfectly observable but correlated more or less perfectly with low productivity.
Tagging is also not perfect.
2An exception is Boadway et al. (1999), where the accuracy of monitoring depends on the e⁄ort level of social
workers. Boadway et al. (1999) characterize the optimal payment and monitoring of social workers who shirk.
Shirking induces errors in screening between disabled and low-ability claimants (the latter are the able in our
model). Contrastingly, the endogenous monitoring of our model depends upon the resources devoted to it and there
is no agency problem involved in the tagging process. We also relax Boadway et al.￿ s assumption that government
policy is designed such that all low-ability and disabled people apply for welfare assistance. The other di⁄erences
between our model and that of Boadway et al. (1999) will become apparent as we proceed.
3In EU countries, about 30% of people who report severe disability do not get disability bene￿ts and work
(Eurostat, 2001).
1errors, is taken as given, this paper shows that there should always remain some type II errors
(i.e., able people who falsely claim to be disabled and receive disability bene￿ts). When the
marginal cost of monitoring is very high, no monitoring (hence a type II error probability of one)
is optimal. More surprising, even when monitoring is perfect and costless, it is optimal that some
type II errors prevail. Since labor supply is restricted to be binary, the direct truthful mechanism
that implements the optimal allocation is never fully revealing. Therefore, to reach the ideal full
information allocation, the tax authority needs to not only observe the correct health status of
claimants by its monitoring, but must also observe their precise disutility if they worked. Since
perfect monitoring provides correct information on the health status of claimants but not on
their disutility from work, having some people who commit fraud is optimal, under asymmetric
information.
In this paper, optimal tax formulas are derived to provide a clear understanding of the key
economic e⁄ects underlying them. This allows better analysis of the new e⁄ects that monitoring
and take-up imply for standard formulas. To ease the comparison with the existing literature,
these formulas are presented as functions of the behavioral elasticities.
Non-take-up may exist because of the costs of learning about and applying for the program
or because of stigma costs (e.g., Sen, 1995; Currie, 2006). This paper emphasizes the endogenous
stigma ￿ la Besley and Coate (1992) as an explanation of the non-take-up phenomenon. Given the
imperfect observability of disability,4 there are recipients whose decision to claim bene￿ts can be
directly attributed to laziness and not to disability. When one is truly disabled, being considered as
an undeserving (i.e., lazy) recipient is demeaning and stigmatizing. This stigma increases with the
number of cheaters. Although no empirical papers have studied this endogenous stigma, anecdotal
evidence about people who cheat in welfare programs and then create doubts or social resentment
against their peers seems persistent enough to open the path to more investigation. To the best
of our knowledge, the endogenous stigma ￿ la Besley and Coate has never been studied in the
optimal income tax and tagging literature. Our optimal tax formula then includes all e⁄ects that
arise from the stigma externality. Moreover, this paper also studies the robustness of the optimal
tax formula to an alternative take-up cost function. Importantly, all of our results are also valid
without any take-up cost.
The analysis is realized under a normative criterion corrected for features that individuals are
responsible for (Bossert et al., 1999; Schokkaert et al., 2004). According to this paternalistic ap-
proach, income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work because individuals
are responsible for their own taste for work. Moreover, disabled workers, contrary to the lazy ones,
ought to be compensated for their handicap. The validity of our main results is examined and
con￿rmed under a utilitarian criterion.
We proceed in the following section by setting up the basic model. Assuming the paternalistic
criterion, Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal tax-transfer and monitoring programs under full
information and asymmetric information, respectively. Section 5 studies the robustness of the
results under a utilitarian criterion. Section 6 presents some numerical results.
4In 2005, about 80% of disability recipients su⁄er from mental disorders and musculoskeletal diseases (e.g.,
back pain) (Social Security Administration, 2006). Generally, most of these disabilities are neither easily observed
nor perfectly monitored, even with a deep medical examination (Campioleti, 2002). Therefore, disability transfer
systems are always imperfect. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b) estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who are
ultimately awarded bene￿ts are not disabled.
22 The model
2.1 Individual￿ s behavior
Agents are either able or disabled. Productivities take two values, wH > wL > 0, which correspond
with the gross wages in two types of jobs (low and high skilled). Nd is the proportion of disabled
people in the population. Their productivity is wL. Na ￿ 1 ￿ Nd is the proportion of able people
in the population whose productivity is wH. There is a perfect correlation between disability and
lower productivity. This assumption is in the vein of the statutory de￿nition of disabled people
who are eligible for disability bene￿ts. The applicant is considered to be disabled not just because
of the existence of a medical impairment, but because the impairment drastically reduces his or
her productivity and precludes any substantial and gainful work (Hu et al., 2001). A disabled
worker in a wheelchair who has the functional capability to engage in a substantial gainful job is
not considered disabled either by the U.S. Social Security Act or in this model.
Assume that agents decide whether or not to work. This assumption seems natural since the
empirical literature has shown that the extensive margin of labor responses is important, especially
at the low income end (e.g., Meghir and Phillips, 2008) while most estimates of hours of work
elasticities conditional on working are small (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Utility is quasilinear
and represented by:
v(x) ￿ ￿ if they work,
v(x) ￿ ￿I if they do not work,
where x is consumption, v (x) : R+ ! R : x ! v (x) with v0 > 0 ￿ v00 and limx!1 v0(x) = 0, ￿
is a parameter measuring disutility when working, I is an indicator function that takes the value
of 1 if inactive agents take-up disability bene￿ts and 0 otherwise, and ￿ denotes the (endogenous)
take-up cost.
The disutility of work ￿ is denoted ￿d for the wL-agents and ￿a for the wH-agents. ￿d is
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(￿d) : R+ ! [0;1] : ￿d ! F (￿d) and
the corresponding density function f(￿d). The latter is continuous and positive over its domain. ￿a
is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G(￿a) : R+ ! [0;1] : ￿a ! G(￿a)
and the corresponding (continuous and positive) density function g(￿a).5 Individual characteristics
are private information to each person while the distribution thereof is assumed to be public
information.
The rest of this section de￿nes the endogenous take-up cost ￿ in the utility function. Let us
already emphasize that all results of this paper are still valid when those take-up costs are neglected,
i.e., ￿ = 0, which is the standard assumption in the optimal taxation and tagging literature.
Stigma and snowball take-up costs
We now de￿ne the take-up cost ￿(:) that can be stigma or the take-up cost of snowball.
The phenomenon that disabled recipients are viewed with some suspicion and are vulnerable to
accusations of laziness has largely been documented by psychologists and sociologists since Go⁄man
5We want to see whether an EITC or a NIT is optimal. This requires us to describe only the participation tax
rates. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume a discrete support for skills, like in Saez (2002). For simplicity, we
assume two productivity levels, but increasing the number of productivities would not modify our main results.
Continuity of ￿ is assumed for simplicity.
3(1963). However, to the best of our knowledge, the economics literature has largely neglected that
being considered as an undeserving (i.e., lazy) recipient when one truly is disabled is demeaning
and stigmatizing. This motivates our focus on the reputational stigma ￿ la Besley and Coate
(1992). The undeserving (able) recipients impose a ￿reputational externality￿(Besley and Coate,
1992) on the deserving (disabled) ones.6 When it is known that an individual is receiving disability
bene￿ts, other individuals infer that this individual is probably lazy.7 This creates the reputational
stigma that reduces the recipients￿utility. Stigma is an increasing function of the proportion of
undeserving recipients in the economy, denoted by ￿u
a. The undeserving bene￿ciaries are able
agents who do not work, i.e., they are ￿voluntarily unemployed￿ ; hence, the subscripts a and u are
used. It seems realistic to assume that reputational stigma hurts deserving people more than the
undeserving because the former face a limited choice set. The cost of being perceived as a cheater
is lower for someone who does commit fraud (i.e., an able recipient) than for someone who does
not (i.e., a disabled recipient). Without a⁄ecting the qualitative nature of the results but to later
ease the notations and intuitions, we assume zero stigma e⁄ect for the able recipients. However,
our results are still valid when able people also face positive stigma and the optimal tax formulas
could easily be written with larger stigma on the cheaters than on the deserving.8
The de￿nition of stigma of Besley and Coate (1992) is relevant if we consider a society where
people who do their best abiding by the rules are respected and admired (even if they are quasi-
unproductive) and where people who do not comply with the rules (even in a cunning way) are
despised. If we want to model a society where cheats and ￿old foxes￿are admired, stigma should
be a decreasing function of ￿u
a. The take-up by undeserving people then has a snowball e⁄ect on
take-up by the deserving.9
The type of take-up cost then depends on the ￿rst derivative: Stigma (snowball take-up cost)
prevails when ￿0 (￿u
a) > 0 (￿0 (￿u
a) < 0). The rest of the paper will mainly focus on the general
form ￿0 (￿u
a), letting the reader choose the type of take-up cost she/he prefers.
2.2 The government￿ s decisions
A feature of disability systems is that the eligibility of applicants is assessed on the basis of
the disability status rather than being solely dependent on reported incomes. The process of
6Society is deemed to value certain individual characteristics, such as willingness to earn one￿ s income from
work when one is able to do so (e.g., Sen, 1995; Lindbeck et al., 1999). A social norm claiming that disabled,
low-productivity people should get transfers also prevails (e.g., Wol⁄, 2004). Given the imperfect observability of
disability, there are (lazy) able agents who do not deserve bene￿ts but receive them.
7Anecdotal evidence about this reputational stigma e⁄ect also exists in politics or sport. For instance, during
the 2006 Tour de France, when several exceptional cyclists were revealed to have taken drugs to improve their
performances, the entire profession lost its credibility and all cyclists were suspected of being cheats.
8Introducing larger stigma on the able applicants than on the disabled ones implies that take-up costs are an
ordeal associated with desirable screening (e.g., Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and Cu⁄ (2000)).
9Rather than explaining the snowball e⁄ect with a society where cheats and old foxes are admired, alternative
empirical explanations can prevail. In the vein of recent empirical studies that look at endogenous social interactions
and peer e⁄ects (e.g., Aizer and Currie, 2004), it can become less embarrassing to live on transfers when more
individuals do likewise (Lindbeck et al., 1999). Alternatively, the snowball e⁄ect can be explained by complexity or
the rigor of the monitoring technology, see Kleven and Kopczuk (2010) for a model of transfer program complexity
(however, without tax revenue and without administrative costs). Complexity is an instrument used by program
administrators to increase the intensity of screening, hence to reduce errors. Higher complexity requires larger
governmental expenditure per applicant, e.g., because of the increased number of tests and interviews with doctors.
Larger monitoring expenditure per applicant reduces ￿u
a, as it will be made explicit in Section 2.2. A reduction of ￿u
a
could then be viewed as resulting from an increase in complexity, the latter inducing a higher cost to the applicant
￿(:) (e.g., the time spent applying or a cognitive cost of having a lot of testing). Complexity is then allowed for in
our model when ￿0 (￿u
a) < 0 is assumed.
4determining individual eligibility has been called ￿tagging￿by Akerlof (1978). In Akerlof (1978),
tagging allows perfect identi￿cation of a given subset of disabled people. In this paper, it is assumed
that the accuracy of tagging is limited by the non-take-up phenomenon. Even if disabled people
are aware of their eligibility, some of them might not claim disability bene￿ts depending on the
level of bene￿t and the associated stigma or take-up cost. Moreover, it is assumed that disability
agencies are unable perfectly to detect able claimants.
Di⁄ering from the existing literature (Stern, 1982; Diamond and Sheshisnki, 1995; Parsons,
1996), the monitoring (tagging) technology is not exogenous in this model. The accuracy of
monitoring depends on the per capita resources, M, devoted to it. The higher is M, the lower is
the probability of type II error ￿ (￿false positive￿ ), i.e., the higher the precision with which an
able agent claiming disability bene￿ts is detected. This model analyzes the choice of monitoring
expenditures, (M), that is equivalent to choosing the level of type II errors (￿). Formally, the
per capita cost of monitoring, M(￿), depends on the precision of the monitoring technology with
@M=@￿ < 0, @2M=@￿2 > 0, lim￿!0 M(￿) = +1, and M(1) = 0.10
Under full information (so-called ￿rst-best), the disability agencies have no role to play, there
is no monitoring and no type II error. Therefore, there is no stigma e⁄ect: ￿(￿u
a) = 0. The
government implements a tax policy depending on ￿ and wY (Y = L;H), hence it also assigns
individuals to low-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is wL), to high-skilled jobs (where the gross
wage is wH) or to inactivity (activity u). Activity assignment is captured through the functions
‘L (￿d) : R+ ! f0;1g : ‘L (￿d) = 1 (‘L (￿d) = 0) if wL-agents with this value for ￿d are employed
(inactive) and ￿H (￿a) : R+ ! f0;1g : ￿H (￿a) = 1 (￿H (￿a) = 0) if wH-agents with this value for
￿a are employed (inactive). wL-agents cannot get access to high-skilled jobs and, since e¢ ciency
matters, it will never be optimal that wH-agents work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people
in high-skilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more and that increase can be used to
rise consumption bundles. Hence, formally, the government determines four consumption functions:
xw
L (￿d) for the wL-workers, xw
H (￿a) for the wH-workers, xu
L (￿d) for the wL-inactive agents, and
xu
H (￿a) for the wH-inactive. All of these functions go from R+ to R+.
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where R(? 0) is the exogenous revenue available to the economy.
This model highlights the e⁄ects of errors in distributing disability bene￿ts. Therefore a clear
boundary between eligible and noneligible people is needed. This suggests the following distinction
between disutility of the disabled ￿d and the able ￿a. We assume that ￿d measures disutility
when working as a result of disability, i.e., the intensity of the physical or mental pain associated
with work as a result of disability if relevant (Harkness, 1993; Cu⁄, 2000; Marchand et al., 2003).
Contrastingly, ￿a is disutility when working as a result of distaste for work or work aversion.
Following Arneson (1990) and Roemer (1998), people are held responsible for their taste for work ￿a
10In summary, disability agencies do not observe either ￿d or ￿a. They perfectly observe the disability status
of wL-agents (and hence their lower productivity). However, they tag some able as disabled, hence type II errors
prevail.
5while ￿d stems from luck; hence, those people are not responsible for it. Therefore, able (disabled)
people are unambiguously noneligible (eligible) for disability bene￿ts.11
Our ￿rst social objective function uses a paternalistic view for the valuation of distaste for
work. The government has a reference distaste for work equal to zero, i.e., it attaches a weight of












H(￿a)) + (1 ￿ ‘H (￿a))v (xu
H(￿a))]dG(￿￿)
￿
This normative criterion is a sum (weighted by the share in the population) of utility functions
corrected for the features that individuals are responsible for. Implicit in this approach is the
idea that income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work (￿a) because
individuals are responsible for their own taste for work, and disabled workers contrary to the lazy
ones ought to be compensated for their handicap. Schokkaert et al. (2004) and Cremer et al.
(2007), for instance, consider this type of social objective function, but alternative paternalistic
objectives are possible. Marchand et al. (2003) and Pestieau and Racionero (2009) consider
another paternalistic approach in which the government attaches a larger weight to the labor
disutility of disabled individuals. Our approach is also close to that used in behavioral economics
when social planners does not use, in their objective function, individual preferences but their own
preferences (O￿ Donoghue and Rabin, 2003; Kanbur et al., 2006). Maximization of paternalistic
social preferences typically selects allocations that are not Pareto e¢ cient.












H(￿a)) ￿ ￿a) + (1 ￿ ‘H (￿a))(v (xu
H(￿a)))]dG(￿￿)
￿
The only di⁄erences with the paternalist criterion are in the terms v (xw
H(￿a)), which are substituted
by v (xw
H(￿a)) ￿ ￿a. It can be seen as contradictory to use both a utilitarian criterion and a costly
monitoring technology. One screens people with high distaste for work, ￿a, on the one hand, and
compensates for distaste for work, ￿a, by including ￿a in the utilitarian preferences, on the other
hand. However, this is a standard objective in the optimal tax and tagging literature.
The results derived under utilitarian preferences will be given in Section 5 and compared to
the ones obtained under the paternalistic utilitarian criterion. We use the superscripts U and P
for the utilitarian and paternalistic criteria, respectively, and we drop these superscripts from the
di⁄erent variables for notational simplicity.
3 Full information
Proposition 1 In full information, everyone gets the same consumption (x) under paternalistic
utilitarian preferences, and a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. All able people work while
only disabled agents with ￿d ￿ v0(x)wL do work.
11It is possible to follow the suggestion by Pestieau and Racionero (2009) to disentangle the disabled￿ s parameter
into two components: ￿ = ￿a + ￿d and again to hold people responsible for their taste parameter ￿a but not for
their disability parameter ￿d. However this complicates the model without bringing further analytical gains.
6A proof is given in Appendix A and the intuition is as follows. Suppose all able individuals are
working. The social bene￿t of having the able individuals with the highest ￿a stop working is zero.
The cost of having an able individual who stops working is wH(> 0). Therefore, it is optimal that
all able agents work. The same exercise can be done for disabled people. Suppose all disabled
individuals are working. The social bene￿t of having a disabled agent endowed with ￿d to stop
working is ￿d 2 [0;1) and the social cost is wL(> 0), which is constant. Therefore, there is a
threshold value b ￿d such that those with ￿d > b ￿d do not work and those with ￿d ￿ b ￿d do work. b ￿d is
such that the net loss of utility when the marginal disabled individuals are shifted from the disability
assistance to the low-skilled job is equal to the gain of resources (wL) valued according to their
common marginal utility, i.e., b ￿d = v0(x)wL with x denoting the consumption level. Consumption
levels are the same for all individuals (x) since the ￿rst-order conditions require identical marginal
utility of consumption for all individuals with additively separable utility functions. Therefore,
the transfer (or tax) toward the disabled workers, x ￿ wL, is lower than the transfer toward the
inactive disabled, x. This is the de￿nition of a Negative Income Tax (NIT), which is then optimal.
4 Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information, the tax authority is only able to observe income levels and thus
can condition taxation only on income. However, when monitoring is introduced, disability agen-
cies have access to more information than the tax authority. The optimization problem for the
government takes place over three consumption bundles xu, xL, xH (in doing so, it also assigns
people to work or inactivity)12 and the optimal level of type II errors ￿ 2 (0;1].
The government needs to take into account the set of incentive compatibility constraints (here-
after ICC) to prevent individuals from a given type from taking the tax-treatment designed for
individuals of other types.
Since our objective functions are increasing in individuals￿consumption, it will, just like in the
￿rst-best, never be optimal that able people work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in
high-skilled jobs instead, they produce more that can be used to increase everyone￿ s consumption
in a way that respects the ICC and hence increases social objective value. Consequently, to induce
high-skilled people to work in high-skilled jobs,
xH ￿ xL; (1)
since the individual aversion to work ￿a is the same in both jobs. A formal proof is given in
Appendix B. Therefore, no able individuals mimic disabled workers at the optimum.13 The
remaining incentive problem consists in able individuals who mimic disabled recipients.
Recall that with a probability ￿, able individuals who claim disability bene￿ts are accepted.
With a probability 1￿￿, they are caught and therefore go back to work. Having all detected able
12In the literature on optimal redistributive taxation initiated by Mirrlees (1971), nonemployment, if any, is
synonymous with nonparticipation. There is no job search; hence, people who do not work make the choice of being
inactive, i.e., there is no (so-called) involuntary unemployment. Similarly, there is no involuntary unemployment in
this model. However, since disabled people face real physical or mental pain at work, they are eligible for disability
bene￿ts (xu).
13Equation (1) implies that only disabled people work in unskilled jobs at the optimum. Therefore, they are
perfectly tagged as disabled. Being recognized as disabled is not a characteristic that implies stigma, contrarily.
7claimants who go back to work can be assumed but it can also be the result of the optimal tax
program where able agents who claim disability bene￿ts and are detected choose either to receive
a welfare bene￿t or to go back to work. Appendix C states the proof.
We introduce the threshold value e ￿a. It characterizes able agents who are indi⁄erent between
choosing either v(xH)￿￿a or, with a probability ￿, v(xu) and with a probability 1￿￿, v(xH)￿￿a.
The ICC14 on agents of wH-type can be written as:




, e ￿a = v(xH) ￿ v(xu) (2)
such that a high-skilled agent with taste parameter ￿a prefers high-skilled employment to claiming
bene￿ts if and only if ￿a ￿ e ￿a. Equation (2) emphasizes that the decision of able people to apply
or not for disability bene￿ts does not depend on the probability ￿.15
Disabled agents choose between v(xL)￿￿d and v(xu)￿￿ (:). Disabled agents characterized by
￿d ￿ e ￿d (￿d > e ￿d) choose to work (to apply for disability bene￿ts). Hence, the ICC on disabled
states:



















, the share of population that is able and unduly collect
disability bene￿ts. Recall that we can consider either that ￿(:) represents stigma (hence, ￿0(￿u
a) > 0
and ￿ (:) ! 0 if either e ￿a ! 1 or ￿ ! 0), or that ￿(:) represents snowball take-up costs (hence,
￿0(￿u
a) < 0 and ￿ (:) reaches its minimum value if either e ￿a ! 0 or ￿ ! 1), or there is no take-up
cost and ￿(￿u
























Following an increase in xu, the global e⁄ect on e ￿d can be decomposed into a positive direct e⁄ect
and a negative indirect e⁄ect with stigma (or a positive indirect e⁄ect with the snowball take-up
cost). The increase in the proportion of disabled people claiming assistance (or equivalently, the
diminishing level of e ￿d) is the direct e⁄ect. The indirect e⁄ect stems from the enlargement of stigma
(the decrease of snowball take-up cost) that follows the fall in e ￿a, which in turn leads to a decrease
(increase) in the proportion of disabled recipients or, equivalently, to an increase (decrease) in e ￿d.
Lemma 1 Active and inactive people in both ability groups coexist under asymmetric information
(i.e., 1 > e ￿d > 0 and 1 > e ￿a > 0).
14It can easily be checked that the set of ICC for each agent of type (wY ;￿y) (with ￿y 2 R+, Y = L;H and
y = d;a) can be rewritten as constraints (1)-(3).




, the worst utility outcome when taking the lottery (i.e., when applying for
bene￿ts) is identical to the utility reached when not taking the lottery. Therefore, ￿ does not drive the decision to
apply or not for bene￿ts.
8Appendix D provides the proof.
From (2) and e ￿a > 0; we know that
xH > xu
The government budget constraint becomes
￿w
d (wL ￿ xL) ￿ (￿u
d + ￿w
a )xu + ￿w








M(￿) = ￿R, (5)
where ￿w
d is the share of population that is disabled and works, ￿u
d is the share of population that is
disabled and receives disability bene￿ts, ￿u
a is the share of population that is able but unjusti￿ably
collects disability bene￿ts, ￿w
a is the proportion of the population that is able and works (it includes
the refused undeserving claimants). Table 1 displays the proportion of individuals in each position.
The per capita cost of monitoring M(￿) appears ex ante and for any individual who has applied


















































Table 1: Distribution of individuals in the population
To simplify the optimal tax formulas, we can introduce more de￿nitions. Let TL = wL ￿ xL,
TH = wH ￿ xH, and Tu = ￿xu, be the tax paid by disabled workers, able workers, and people on
disability assistance, respectively. Hence, ￿Tu is the disability bene￿t. Let us de￿ne the elasticity
of participation of the disabled workers with respect to xL and the elasticity of the able workers






























v0(xL) from (3) and where @￿w





These elasticities measure the percentages of disabled (able) workers in low-skilled (high-skilled)
jobs who decide to leave the labor force when xL (xH) decreases by 1 percent.
Next, we de￿ne the marginal social welfare weight for working agents whose consumption is
xL and xH, respectively, as the ratio of the social marginal utility of consumption and the shadow









Disabled individuals are not responsible for the stigmatization (or snowball) phenomenon. One
can then argue that they are not responsible for the impact of ￿ on their well being. Therefore,
9there are good reasons to integrate it in the paternalistic utilitarian preferences e SP,
e SP ￿ Nd
"Z e ￿d
0










a v(xH) + ￿u
av(xu)
The Lagrangian states as
$P ￿ e SP + ￿[￿w
d (wL ￿ xL) ￿ (￿u
d + ￿u
a)xu + ￿w
a (wH ￿ xH) ￿ (￿u
d + ￿u
a=￿)M(￿) + R]
, where e ￿a (e ￿d) is given by (2) ((3)).
















Let subscripts to the function e SP denote the partial derivative of e SP with respect to the argument














The following theorem states the solution for the second-best problem.
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels and type II errors











































@xH applies to the indirect behav-
ioral responses and indirect welfare change that arise from the endogenous take-up cost,
￿









The proof as well as a simple heuristic interpretation in the spirit of Saez (2002) is provided in
Appendix E.
Substituting M(￿) = 0 in (12) yields the standard optimal tax schedule with extensive responses
(Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002). The ￿nancial incentive to enter the labor force, i.e., TL ￿ Tu, is




in the vein of the inverse elasticity rule
of Ramsey. Similarly, the ￿nancial incentive to enter the labor force increases with the marginal
social welfare weight of (disabled) workers (gL).16 With costly monitoring (M(￿) > 0), our formula
16From (12), an optimal replacement rate formula can also be derived, as done in Kroft (2008). This implies
following Kroft￿ s assumption of zero taxation in unskilled jobs, i.e., xL = wL, to neglect monitoring costs and to








. Then it can easily be shown that (12) becomes
an optimal replacement rate formula as a function of the elasticity of participation.
10emphasizes that the ￿nancial incentive to enter the labor force also increases with the per capita
cost of monitoring. Intuitively, monitoring costs make inactivity more expensive, hence ￿nancial
incentives are needed to reduce inactivity. Corollary 1 will discuss the optimal tax formula (12) in
more detail.
Compared with (12), the optimal formula (13) has two key changes given the stigma externality
and the paternalistic criterion.
First, the term e ￿a=(￿xH) is a result of the fact that the marginal disutility e ￿a is not included
in the paternalistic criterion. This term appears since the e⁄ect of an in￿nitesimal change in the
consumption bundle of able workers (dxH) induces the pivotal able agents to start working, which
has a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on paternalistic evaluation of their well-being equal to v(xH)￿v(xu), which
by virtue of (2) reduces to e ￿a. The denominator in (13) converts this e⁄ect in terms of public funds
and makes it relative to xH. This term is sometimes called the paternalistic or ￿rst-best motive
for taxation since it arises from di⁄erences between social and private preferences (Kanbur et al.,
2006). It corrects the labor supply of able people to correspond more closely to social preferences.
The term e ￿a=(￿xH) increases their ￿nancial incentive to enter the labor force, i.e., TH ￿ Tu.
Second, ￿(xH;xL;xu;￿) includes all of the e⁄ects from the externality created by stigma or








, which indirectly induces @￿w
d =@xH pivotal disabled recipients to
change their occupational choice as a result of stigma (snowball take-up cost) e⁄ects. Using the
envelope theorem and (2) and (3), @￿w
d =@xH > 0 (< 0) if @￿=@e ￿a > 0 (< 0). Each disabled
recipient entering the labor force induces a revenue gain of wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿), i.e., the tax
paid by each new disabled worker (wL ￿ xL) and the bene￿t that stops being paid to him/her.
There is also a gain in monitoring expenditures (M(￿)) for the disabled who stop applying for
disability bene￿ts. Hence, the total gain is (wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿))(@￿w
d =@xH)dxH. The change
dxH also a⁄ects welfare through a change in the stigma intensity of the ￿u
d disabled recipients.
This change in terms of public funds is valued ￿￿u
d (@￿=@xH=￿)dxH by the government. Then, all
of the indirect e⁄ects implied by the stigma (take-up cost) externality when dxH > 0 are denoted
by ￿(xH;xL;xu;￿) de￿ned in Proposition 2.
Equation (14) is similar to Diamond and Sheshinski (1995)￿ s equation (6), p. 6. It yields an
important redistributive principle of the optimal redistributive programs, which prevails indepen-
dently of stigma e⁄ects. It is associated with an equal marginal change of the consumption of
everyone in the economy. Consider a uniform increase in all private utilities of one unit. This
does not change activity decisions. To accomplish this uniform increase, we need per wY -worker
1=v0 (xY ) extra units of consumption (Y = L;H), and per inactive person we need 1=v0 (xu) ex-
tra units of consumption. Weighting this by the frequencies of these groups in the population,




units of public revenue to ￿nance this




. This has to be equal
to the increase in the social objective function caused by the uniform increase in utilities, which
is equal to D. Remarkably, under paternalistic utilitarian preferences, D = 1 from (11). Equation
(14) thus equates the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds to the ratio of the average of the
inverse of the private utilities and the marginal social utility of a uniform increase in all individual
utilities, the latter being equal to one under paternalism. Multiplying both sides of (14) by ￿, this
11principle can be rephrased as: the average (using population proportions) value of the inverses of
the marginal welfare weights is one.
Equation (15) is developed in Appendix E (see Equation (23)). In case of an interior solution
(￿ < 1), the optimal amount of monitoring is such that the impact of a small increase in the
probability of type II errors d￿ > 0 cancels out the mechanical and behavioral e⁄ects (detailed in
Appendix E) such that @$=@￿ = 0.17 When the marginal cost of monitoring j@M=@￿j is not huge,
monitoring is always optimal (i.e., ￿ < 1) because it reduces the number of undeserving recipients,
thereby improving e¢ ciency. It also reduces stigmatization (with @￿=@￿ > 0). However, when
j@M=@￿j is very high, ￿ = 1 prevails at the optimum. No monitoring is optimal, as whoever applies
for disability bene￿ts obtains them. From simulations, Section 6 shows when monitoring becomes
suboptimal (i.e., ￿ = 1).
It is well known (Diamond 1980) that subsidizing low-paid workers more than inactive people
(i.e., TL < Tu) can be optimal when labor supply is modeled along the extensive margin. Using
the de￿nition of Saez (2002), an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is then optimal. On the other
hand, when TL > Tu, a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. With labor supply modeled along
the extensive margin, Saez (2002) shows that an EITC or NIT prevails depending on whether
gL ￿ 1 or gL < 1. The following corollary emphasizes that the su¢ cient condition for an EITC
is still valid with costly monitoring, but not under NIT. Costly monitoring supports the use of an
EITC since it makes inactivity more expensive.
Corollary 1 With costless monitoring, an EITC or a NIT is optimal depending on gL ￿ 1 (gL <
1) (Saez, 2002). With costly monitoring, gL ￿ 1 implies an EITC, and the EITC result can also
carry through with gL < 1.
Proof. From (12), gL ￿ 1 , TL￿Tu ￿ M(￿); hence, an EITC is optimal. This result prevails
with M(￿) ￿ 0. Moreover, from (12), gL < 1 , TL ￿ Tu < M(￿). Therefore, M(￿) = 0 implies
that a NIT is optimal. When M(￿) > 0 (i.e., ￿ < 1), the previous inequality does not imply
TL < Tu (i.e., a NIT) anymore.
At this stage of the analysis, it becomes obvious that Lemma 1, Proposition 2, and Corollary
1 may easily be extended to a more general utility function, but at the cost of more extensive
notation and derivations without bringing further economic intuitions and results, so we prefer to
stick to the simple quasilinear form.
Interestingly, Corollary 1 and the next proposition highlight that the government should o⁄er
particularly strong ￿nancial incentives to the disabled and not trap all of them into inactivity.
This supports adoption of an EITC (Corollary 1) and, in addition, because the consumption then
received by disabled workers is necessarily larger than that of those who are non-employed:
Proposition 3 Consumption of workers in low-skilled jobs is strictly larger than the disability
bene￿t, xL > xu.
17In a model with a perfect (i.e., without any error) but costly monitoring technology, Cremer et al. (2007)
show that the optimal number of monitored people is determined by the trade-o⁄ between the negative e⁄ect of
monitoring on public expenditures (i.e., the mechanical loss in monitoring expenditures) and its positive e⁄ect via
the welfare gain stemming from less stringent ICC. Similarly, in our model, decreasing ￿ implies a mechanical loss
in monitoring expenditures and gains on government revenue as a result of behavioral responses. In our model,
modifying monitoring also a⁄ects the stigma (snowball take-up cost). This externality modi￿es welfare and implies
behavioral responses from disabled agents.
12Appendix F states the proof. The result xL > xu can seem counterintuitive at ￿rst sight for two
reasons. First, those who get the lowest consumption are also those who su⁄er from stigma. Second,
our result contrasts with those of Akerlof (1978) and SalaniØ (2002). They show analytically that
tagged disabled people obtain larger consumption than untagged ones, i.e., xL > xu. In this
literature, tagging improves equity by giving higher transfers to some of the more needy. At the
same time, tagging also improves e¢ ciency by circumventing the ICC that normally limits the
extent of redistribution.
The reverse ranking of consumption levels obtained in Proposition 3 can intuitively be explained
by a new e¢ ciency e⁄ect. The latter appears when the tagged population includes a proportion
of disabled who are ready to work, and it is not optimal to release that proportion from work
activity. It implies that disabled workers should receive higher consumption than is provided to
those disabled persons who do not work, xL > xu. In standard tagging models, since the disabled
are by assumption always inactive, no e¢ ciency e⁄ect will push the consumption of untagged
disabled above that of the tagged disabled.18
The next proposition points out that when perfect monitoring can be realized without any
governmental spending, using it is, however, not optimal.
Proposition 4 With costless monitoring, perfect monitoring (i.e., ￿ = 0) is not optimal under
paternalistic utilitarian preferences. This result holds with or without stigma.
Appendix G gives the proof. This quite surprising result relies on the fact that, since the labor
supply is restricted to be binary, the directly truthful mechanism that implements the optimal
allocations is never fully revealing (see Equations (2)-(3)). Workers fully reveal their wY (Y = L;H)
information but not their ￿ value, and they announce only that their ￿ is larger than e ￿y with y = d
(y = a) for wL(wH)-workers. Moreover, inactive agents do not reveal either their exact wY or
their ￿y. In this context, monitoring improves information on the inactive but full revelation never
occurs. In other words, even when ￿ = 0 is feasible without any cost, an instrument is still missing
to reach the ￿rst-best. To implement the ￿rst-best allocation, the tax authority would need to
observe not only the health status (through perfect monitoring) but also the precise ￿ level.
We have emphasized that costless and perfect monitoring does not imply full information.
Now, let us recall that the full information optimum is characterized by all able agents who work
(Proposition 1). In the second-best, perfect monitoring allows that all able agents work (hence,
stigma is zero, if any). However, even when this does not cost anything, it is always optimal
to have imperfect monitoring. This can be intuitively explained as follows. In the second-best
with costless and perfect monitoring (￿ = 0), equalizing the consumption levels such that we tend
toward the ￿rst-best optimum, all disabled agents stop working and create a considerable loss of
tax revenue. This sharply contrasts with the ￿rst-best allocation where the disabled with ￿d below
some threshold do work. Using ￿nancial incentives, xL > xu, is the only way to guarantee that
some disabled agents work in the second-best (since we do not observe their individual disutility).
Moreover, ￿nancial incentives for able agents are also required to avoid that they all only work
in low-skilled jobs. The lowest ￿nancial incentive such that they all work in high-skilled jobs is
18This result is in the vein of a ￿dual-NIT system￿(Parsons, 1996), where some able people who get disability
bene￿ts (type II errors) also receive incentives to work.
13xH = xL, ￿ being equal to zero. In other words, ￿ = 0 yields ￿ = v0 (xH) = v0 (xL) < v0 (xu) (as
also emphasized in the proof in Appendix G). This has a welfare cost for the disabled that implies
that ￿ > 0 (hence, v0 (xH) < ￿) is preferred.
Interestingly, this result holds with stigma, with snowball take-up cost, or without either of
them. Our model does not require take-up costs to show that no type II error is suboptimal.
We believe that this result may be of some use for policy recommendations. In Norway for
instance, several economists and politicians have recently proposed strengthening controls in dis-
ability programs to eliminate those able people who abuse the system. In the current budgetary,
demographic, and economic contexts, to cut unnecessary costs may be a good idea. However, a
government that, roughly speaking, wants to help the disabled but not lazy able persons should
allow some cheating, according to Proposition 4. This occurs because to reach the ideal ￿rst-best
optimum requires not only perfect information on the health status of claimants (able versus dis-
abled) but also their precise disutility of work given their handicap. Since this is not feasible,
perfect monitoring would be welfare-reducing.
5 The utilitarian criterion
This section emphasizes that most of the results we have derived under paternalistic utilitarian
preferences are still valid under the utilitarian criterion, SU.
Proposition 5 In full information, everyone receives the same consumption x under utilitarian
preferences and a NIT prevails. Disabled and able agents with ￿y > b ￿y = v0(x)wY (y;Y ) = (d;L)
or (a;H), do not work.
The proof is provided in Appendix A. Under full information, it is optimal to have able people
who do not work and receive disability bene￿ts, under utilitarian preferences. This result contrasts
with the full information optimum under the paternalistic utilitarian criterion (Proposition 1).
In the second-best, because of the ICC, the utilitarian preferences become
e SU ￿ Nd
"Z e ￿d
0





































The following proposition gives the optimal second-best allocation.
Proposition 6 In asymmetric information, the utilitarian optimal consumption levels and type II


















Since the proof is identical to the one in Proposition 2, it is skipped here. There is no more change
in welfare (directly) due to the behavioral response of the pivotal able workers leaving the labor
14force, characterized by ￿a = e ￿a. Their well-being weight is now the same, in the social preferences,
whether they are recipients or workers. Therefore, compared with Equation (13) in Proposition 2,
the paternalistic term e ￿a=(￿xH) does not appear in the above equation.
From Equation (12) in Proposition 6, it is straightforward to see that Corollary 1 is still valid
under utilitarianism. Again, monitoring supports an EITC.
Proposition 7 Under utilitarianism, the consumption of workers in low-skilled jobs is strictly
larger than the disability bene￿t, xL > xu.
Since the proof is identical to the one of Proposition 3, it is skipped here. The intuition is identical
to the one we provided for Proposition 3.
Proposition 8 With costless monitoring, perfect monitoring (i.e., ￿ = 0) is not optimal under
utilitarianism. This result holds with or without stigma.
The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 4 (in Appendix G). Under utilitarianism, as with
the paternalistic utilitarian criterion, ￿ = 0 coexists with xH = xL > xu. Moreover, perfect
monitoring implies that all able never obtain disability bene￿ts. Contrastingly, in the ￿rst-best
utilitarian optimum, disabled but also able agents (with ￿ above some threshold values) do not
work (Proposition 5). This is never reached with ￿ = 0. Hence, even if costless, ￿ = 0 is not
optimal in the second-best.
6 An illustration
This section implements our optimal tax formulas to check when monitoring becomes suboptimal,
as expected from the discussion of Equation (15) in Proposition 2.
6.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we specify a logarithmic utility function, v(:) ￿ ln(:) and a linear take-up
cost function, ￿ (￿u
a) = s￿u
a with s 2 R. There is no empirical evidence concerning the disutility of
work as a result of disability or aversion to work. Therefore, ￿d and ￿a are distributed according to
Gamma distributions since those distributions take a very large variety of shapes by perturbing only
its r parameter.19 Let r￿d; r￿a be the parameters characterizing Gamma distributions, respectively,
for ￿d and ￿a. In 1998, almost 20% of people in the U.S. reported some level of disability (Stoddard
et al., 1998). In 2001, almost 15% of the population of working age from EU countries reported
severe and moderate disability (Eurostat, 2001). Following Benitez-Silva et al. (2004a), who show
that the hypothesis that self-reported disability is an unbiased indicator that cannot be rejected,





, where ￿(r) is a Gamma law of parameter and the latter is equal to the mean and the variance of the distribution.
We have checked that our conclusions are maintained with other continuous distributions de￿ned on the in￿nite
support [0;+1).
15we take Nd = 0:15 as a benchmark. Here, with two levels of skills, assumptions about wH and wL
cannot be based on actual earnings distributions. The base setting for the parameters is
s = 3, r￿d = 5, r￿a = 1, wL = 50, wH = 100 and R = 0:
In all of our simulations, we consider R strictly larger than ￿[NdwH +NawL] = ￿92:5; otherwise,
the budget constraint (5) is violated. The speci￿cation of the monitoring function is
M(￿) = m(1=￿ ￿ 1) with m > 0: (16)
The value of m is given by (16), where ￿ and M(￿) are replaced by empirical estimates as follows.
Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b) estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who are ultimately
awarded bene￿ts are not disabled; hence, ￿ = 0:2. The (average) monthly disability bene￿t is
$786, about the (average) labor earnings of disabled people wL (however, the variance is large), and
the average cost of running the Social Security Administration (Disability Insurance) bureaucracy,
which determines eligibility for disability bene￿ts, is about $2000 per application in the U.S.
(Benitez-Silva et al., 2004b). The claims are typically reviewed every year. Hence, the monthly
average per capita cost of monitoring is $166.7. Therefore, wL = 4:7M. Since wL = 50, M = 10:6.
M (￿) 2 [7:5;15] is considered to get a range of empirically relevant parameters. Substituting
￿ = 0:2 and M 2 [7:5;15] into (16) gives an interval of plausible values for m, i.e., m 2 [1:8;3:8].
Simulations were performed with Mathematica software and our programs are available upon
request. Technical details of the simulations are described in Appendix H.
6.2 Simulations
A ￿rst exercise gives the threshold values of m in (16) beyond which monitoring is suboptimal
(i.e., ￿ = 1). With the paternalistic utilitarian criterion, monitoring is suboptimal when m ￿
73. With the utilitarian criterion, monitoring is suboptimal (￿ = 1) when m ￿ 50:3. Those
threshold values are large relative to labor earnings in low-skilled jobs (wL = 50) or relative to
(per capita) governmental exogenous resources (R = 0). These thresholds also seem unrealistically
high compared with the interval of empirically plausible values, 1:8 ￿ m ￿ 3:8. All our unreported
simulations give unrealistic high threshold values.
Simulations also allow the emphasis of another situation where monitoring is suboptimal and
cannot be captured by the ￿rst-order conditions. Under the utilitarian criterion, when the exoge-
nous resources R become very high (and larger than m and wH according to all of our simulations),
monitoring becomes suboptimal. Figure 1 illustrates this with m = 2. Under utilitarianism, moni-
toring becomes suboptimal when R ￿ 130:96. At R = 130:96, there is a discontinuity in the prob-
ability of type II errors ￿, which jumps up to 1. The proportion of able workers, ￿w
a , then sharply
shrinks. And there is a discontinuity in ￿w
a at R = 130:96 (see Figure 1). Intuitively, since the disu-
tility terms ￿a reduces the utilitarian welfare level, it is optimal that more and more able workers
stop working when R increases. Under paternalistic utilitarianism, our simulations never report a
threshold R beyond which monitoring is suboptimal. Taking large ranges of (s;R;wL;wH;Nd;m)
(such that monitoring is optimal), we varied R but never found any case where monitoring became
suboptimal. Intuitively, able people who stop working reduce e¢ ciency without improving equity

























Figure 1: Optimal probability of type II error and proportion of able workers as functions of R.
work, ￿w
a , is stable (see Figure 1 where m = 2) with R. Financial incentives and monitoring are
both used to keep ￿w
a high and stable. When governmental resources R increase, Type II errors
are reduced. They decrease from 20% to 10% when R increases from ￿60 to 180.
7 Conclusion
This paper assumed an economy where lazy able people may pretend to be disabled and where
some disabled people may not take up disability bene￿ts designed for them. It has been shown
that modeling the monitoring technology and the participation decisions (participation in the labor
market and in disability programs) is critical to designing the optimal tax schedule. Formulas
for optimal taxation and optimal monitoring accuracy have been provided under paternalistic
utilitarian and utilitarian preferences. It has been shown that expensive monitoring supports the
use of an Earned Income Tax Credit. We have also discussed how introducing some endogenous
take-up cost (as in Besley and Coate, 1992) modi￿es the optimal tax formula.
This paper has also shown that when monitoring is costless, perfect monitoring is not optimal.
In other words, some cheating is always optimal. Our simulations have shown the quantitative
sensitivity of the optimal level of type II errors.
A Proofs of Propositions 1 and 5
The Lagrangian states as



















where ￿ is the (nonnegative) Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. We
discuss the paternalistic utilitarian case ￿rst (i.e., X = P), and show how the properties of the
17utilitarian case (X = U) follow.
For any pair (￿d;￿a), the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to the four consumption functions
can be written as:
‘(￿d)[v0(xw
L(￿d)) ￿ ￿] = 0
(1 ￿ ‘(￿d))[v0(xu
L(￿d)) ￿ ￿] = 0
‘(￿a)[v0 (xw
H(￿a)) ￿ ￿] = 0
(1 ￿ ‘(￿a))[v0(xu
H(￿a)) ￿ ￿] = 0
Since ‘(￿y) (y = d;a) is equal to 1 or 0, only two of these ￿rst-order conditions matter. For
those that matter, the corresponding social marginal utilities of consumption have to be equal.
For the other two, the consumption function does not matter (as nobody with this value for ￿y is
receiving it). Therefore, since ￿ is a constant, we have that the ￿rst-order conditions with respect











From (17), the tax/transfer toward the disabled workers, x ￿ wL, is lower than the transfer to







‘(￿a)dG(￿a) + R (18)
x only depends on the number of disabled and the number of able agents who are employed.















The value of our objective function is maximal when all able agents work: ‘(￿a) = 1 8￿a. Therefore,
from the budget constraint, we have x = NdwL
R 1
0 ‘(d￿)dF(d￿) + NawH + R. Further, as ￿d rises
from 0 to 1, the function ‘(￿d)￿d, where ‘(￿d) = 1 8￿d, goes from 0 to 1. Hence, among the
disabled, it will always be optimal to have those in work with the lowest ￿d. Consequently, the
function ‘(￿d) will have the following shape: ‘(￿d) = 1 for all ￿d ￿ b ￿d and ‘(￿d) = 0 otherwise.










, b ￿y = v0(x)wY > 0; (19)
with (y;Y ) = (d;L). Since v0(x) and wL are ￿nite, b ￿d < 1. It implies that it is optimal for some
disabled individuals not to work.
Under utilitarian preferences SU, it is easy to see that the same ￿rst-order conditions as under
SP are obtained, and so the solution is given by (17). Again, we drop the superscript X = U to
18ease the notations. From the budget constraint, we then have (18). Substituting (18) in SU gives


















Keeping the number of employed of both types ￿xed, it is only through the terms on the last
line that the shape of the ‘(￿d) and ‘(￿a) functions matter under utilitarianism. Hence, as ￿k
(k = d;a) rises from 0 to 1, the function ‘(￿k)￿k, where ‘(￿k) = 1 8￿k, goes from 0 to 1. Then
it is always optimal to have those in work with the lowest ￿k(k = d;a). Therefore, the functions
‘(￿d) and ‘(￿a) have the following shape: ‘(￿d) = 1 for all ￿d ￿ b ￿d, otherwise zero and ‘(￿a) = 1
for all ￿a ￿ b ￿a, otherwise zero. Both critical values satisfy (19) with (y;Y ) = (d;L) and (a;H),
respectively. Di⁄ering from the optimum under the paternalistic criterion, since v0(x) and wH are
￿nite, we now have b ￿a < 1, i.e., there are able agents who do not work and receive bene￿ts. From
wH > wL and (19), b ￿a > b ￿d as under paternalism.
B Proof of Equation (1)
By contrast, suppose xH < xL. All able individuals who work choose to produce wL units and
receive net income xL. From (2) and (3), nobody gets xH as a consumption bundle. Then, keeping
xL ￿xed, we can assume dxH > 0 such that xH + dxH = xL: Now, able people who work produce
wH units and get xH as a consumption bundle. Increasing the level of xH up to xL does not
require any additional consumption since xH +dxH ￿xL = 0 and since e ￿a and the number of able
people who work is unchanged. The number of able people who apply for and take up bene￿ts is
then also unchanged. Hence, from (3), e ￿d and the number of disabled taking up assistance does
not change as well. Yet, all able workers now choose high-skilled jobs and earn wH(> wL). Since
the cost in terms of supplementary consumption is zero and the di⁄erence wH ￿ wL is strictly
positive, a net receipt appears: wH ￿wL > 0. The ￿scal pie increases and more redistribution can
occur. This will indubitably increase welfare. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the government
to let xL > xH and, thus, consumption when producing more units must be larger: xH ￿ xL.




v(x) = ￿1. Able agents choose either v(xH) ￿ ￿a or, with a probability ￿,
v(xu) ￿ ￿a and with a probability 1 ￿ ￿, Maxfv(xH) ￿ ￿a;v(T)g, where T is a welfare bene￿t.
The ICC on able agents states






Since ￿￿a is not valued by the Paternalistic Utilitarian criterion and because e¢ ciency matters,
8￿a 2 [0;1), it is optimal that v(xH) ￿ ￿a ￿ v(T). This is the famous ￿principle of maximum
19deterrence￿ . Therefore, since xH > 0, the maximum penalty T = 0 is optimal and all caught able
people go back to work. Therefore, the ICC on able people can be written as (2).
Boadway and Cu⁄ (1999) distinguish between the voluntarily and involuntarily non-employed.
In their model, when the government perfectly identi￿es the voluntary unemployed, the maximum
penalty of zero consumption is assumed. In this model, the maximum penalty to the voluntarily
inactive able people implies that they do go back to work.
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (1) Both e ￿a and e ￿d are smaller than 1. As 8￿a : g(￿a) > 0 (8￿d : f(￿d) > 0), all able
(disabled) people work means e ￿a ! 1 (e ￿d ! 1) at the optimum. Since consumption levels (and
￿(￿u
a)) are ￿nite, from (2) and ((3)), e ￿a and e ￿d cannot tend to 1.
(2) If no one works, i.e., e ￿a = e ￿d = 0, it is optimal for everyone to have the same consumption:
xl = xh = xb = R0 with R0 def
￿ Maxf0;Rg. This allocation will not be optimal if those with the
least ￿ were to choose to work for the additional consumption equal to their marginal product.
It will be the case since v(R0 + wY ) > v(R0) Y = L;H. This implies that e ￿d > 0 (e ￿a > 0) at
the optimum. More generally, for all planners with an objective function that is increasing in
individual utilities, making some disabled work is optimal.
E Proof and heuristic interpretation of Proposition 2
This appendix derives the necessary conditions of Theorem (2) and gives heuristic interpretations.
First-order condition with respect to xL, (12)













Using (6) and (8), this necessary condition can be rewritten as (12).
A simple heuristic interpretation follows. Consider a small increase in consumption xL (e.g., a
small reduction of the income tax in low-skilled jobs), around the optimal tax schedule. There are
a mechanical e⁄ect and a behavioral (or labor supply response) e⁄ect.
Mechanical e⁄ect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to ￿￿w
d dxL because disabled workers have dxL
additional consumption. This mechanically increases social welfare of disabled workers by their
marginal social welfare weight v0(xL)=￿ (￿ gL). Thus, the mechanical welfare gain (expressed in
terms of the value of public funds) as a result of dxL is equal to (v0(xL)=￿)￿w
d dxL. Therefore, the
total mechanical e⁄ect is ￿w
d (v0(xL)=￿ ￿ 1)dxL.
Behavioral e⁄ect Behavioral responses imply a gain in tax revenue. The change dxL > 0 induces
@￿w
d =@xL (pivotal) disabled workers to enter the labor force. Each worker leaving disability assis-
tance induces a gain in government revenue equal to wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿). That is the tax paid
by each disabled worker (wL ￿xL) and the savings from the bene￿ts no longer paid to him/her as
20disabled recipient (xu), as well as the associated cost of monitoring (M(￿)). The total behavioral
gain is equal to (wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿))(@￿w
d =@xL)dxL.
At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical and behavioral e⁄ects equals zero and gives (20).
First-order condition with respect to xH, (13)
Consider a small change dxH > 0. This change implies mechanical and behavioral e⁄ects on
government revenue and welfare.
Mechanical e⁄ect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to ￿￿w
a dxH because able workers consume an
additional dxH. This mechanical decrease in tax revenue, however, is valued (v0(xH)=￿ ￿ 1)￿w
a dxH
by the government since each Euro not raised increases the consumption of able workers and this
consumption gain is socially valued v0(xH)=￿ (￿ gH) in terms of public funds.
Behavioral e⁄ect
There are two e⁄ects (direct and indirect) on government revenue as a result of behavioral responses
following dxH > 0.
(1) A direct behavioral response comes from @￿w
a =@xH (pivotal) previously inactive able agents
who enter the labor force. Each recipient entering the labor force induces a gain in tax revenue of
wH￿xH+xu, i.e., the tax paid by each new able worker (wH￿xH) and the bene￿t that stops being





able people who stop applying for disability bene￿ts. The gain in government expenditures is then
(wH ￿ xH + xu + M(￿)=￿)(@￿w
a =@xH)dxH. The change dxH also induces a welfare gain since
there are @￿w
a =@xH new pivotal workers whose aversion to work e ￿a is not valued in the welfare





a =@xH)dxH. (2) The
previous direct behavioral e⁄ect implies an externality e⁄ect through the change in the take-up
disutility: the change dxH indirectly induces @￿w
d =@xH pivotal disabled recipients to change their
occupational choice as a result of stigma e⁄ects. Using the envelope theorem, (2) and (3), we
have @￿w
d =@xH > 0 (< 0) if @￿=@e ￿a > 0 (< 0). Each disabled recipient entering the labor force
induces a revenue gain of wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿) for the government. Hence, the total gain is
(wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿))(@￿w
d =@xH)dxH. The change dxH also a⁄ects welfare through a change
in the take-up cost￿ s intensity of the ￿u
d disabled recipients. This change in terms of public funds is
valued ￿￿u
d (@￿=@xH=￿)dxH by the government. Then, all indirect e⁄ects implied by the stigma
(or snowball take-up cost) externality when dxH > 0 are denoted by ￿(xH;xL;xu;￿), de￿ned in
Proposition 2.




































Using (7) and (9), the latter equation can be rewritten as (13).
21A necessary condition on the marginal cost of public funds ￿, (14)
The necessary condition (14) comes from equations (12), (13), and the necessary condition with
































Dividing (20), (21), and (22) by v0(xL), v0(xH), and v0(xu), respectively, and adding these equations
gives (14).
First-order condition with respect to ￿, (15)
@$































We interpret this equation heuristically as follows. Consider d￿ > 0, which implies the following
mechanical and behavioral e⁄ects on government revenue and welfare:
Mechanical e⁄ect




because the per capita cost on the (￿u
d + ￿u
a=￿) people who are monitored is reduced (@M(￿)=@￿ <
0).
Behavioral e⁄ect
There are two e⁄ects on government revenue as a result of behavioral responses.














a=￿, as a result of additional able people receiving disability bene￿ts rather than working. This
induces a welfare loss at the expense of workers whose disutility e ￿a was not valued in the pater-






(2) Through stigma e⁄ects, d￿ > 0 induces @￿w
d =@￿ > 0 (< 0) disabled agents to enter (leave)
the labor force when @￿=@￿ > 0 (@￿=@￿ < 0). Each disabled recipient entering the labor force
induces a gain in tax revenue of wL ￿ xL + xu, as well as a gain in monitoring cost of M(￿). In
total, this indirect behavioral gain is (wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿))(@￿w
d =@￿)d￿. The change d￿ also
a⁄ects welfare through a change in the stigma intensity of the ￿u
d disabled recipients. This change
in terms of public funds is valued at ￿￿u
d (@￿=@￿=￿)d￿ by the government.
In case of an interior solution for ￿, all of these mechanical and behavioral e⁄ects sum to zero.
The inequality (23) is then binding.
22F Proof of Proposition 3



















, xH > xu > xL (25)
In both cases, (24) and (25), v0(xH) < ￿. Moreover, if (24) prevails, we have: v0(xu) > ￿ and
if (25) is correct then: v0(xL) > ￿. However, v0(xL) > ￿ implies that the left-hand side of (12)
is positive. This requires that wL ￿ xL + xu + M(￿) < 0 , xL ￿ xu > wL + M(￿) > 0, which
contradicts xu > xL.
G Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For contrast, we assume ￿ = 0. We then have ￿(:) = 0;20 ￿w
a = Na (and the ICC on the





















Since a weighted average with positive weights is bounded by its least and greatest elements, and
since xL > xu (from (3)): 1
v0(xL) ￿ 1
v0(xH) ￿ 1
v0(xu) with at least a strict inequality. From the
￿rst inequality: xL ￿ xH. However xL > xH does not prevail at the optimum (otherwise all
able recognized as cheaters would work in low-skilled jobs, which is ine¢ cient) hence xL = xH.
Substitute the latter into (26) gives v0(xL) = v0(xu) (since 1 ￿ Na = ￿w
d + ￿u
d). This contradicts
xL > xu. Therefore ￿ > 0.
20With snowball take-up cost, ￿ = 0 implies that ￿(￿u
a) is maximal and is not a⁄ected by a marginal change in
any consumption level. Therefore, this proof is still valid.

















































Substituting ￿ = v0 (xH) into the latter gives (26).
23H Numerical method
Combining constraints (2), (3), (5), and the paternalistic utilitarian criterion, it is convenient to

























































. Similarly, the constrained maximization of the utilitarian
criterion can easily be rewritten as a three-dimensional problem.
The associated system of ￿rst-order conditions is highly nonlinear and too complex to be
studied analytically. Therefore, since multiple local optima may exist, for each vector of parameters
(s;R;wL;wH;Nd) and for some speci￿c distribution functions F(￿d) and G(￿a), and monitoring





. Through this numerical method, we are able to check whether
the solution found is the global optimum.
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